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THE SYMPOSIUM

on "A Free Press and a Fair Trial" that is
here reported was held on April 16, 1966, several weeks after
the Supreme Court of the United States had heard argument in behalf
of Dr. Samuel H. Sheppard who sought to overturn his conviction
for the murder of his wife on July 4, 1954. The Supreme Court
decision in that case on June 6, 1966, is so important to the issue of
free press and fair trial that we thought this symposium would be
incomplete without a brief statement of that holding.
Dr. Sheppard, who at all times denied his guilt, was convicted
in 1955 of second degree murder and given a life sentence. After
serving more than nine years in prison, his petition for a writ of
habeas corpus was granted and he was released by Judge Carl Weinman of the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Ohio.' Judge Weinman held that Dr. Sheppard had not been
afforded a fair trial because of the failure of the trial judge to protect Sheppard sufficiently from the massive, pervasive, and prejudicial
publicity that attended the prosecution. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed by a divided vote.2 That
judgment was in turn reversed when the Supreme Court of the
United States concluded that Sheppard had not received a fair trial
consistent with the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The opinion of the Court by Mr. Justice Clark (Mr. Justice
Black dissented without opinion) is significant for its acknowledgment that identifiable prejudice to the accused need not be proved in
order to establish a denial of due process. Lack of due process can
be demonstrated, Clark said, where "the totality of circumstances"
raises "such a probability that prejudice will result that it is deemed
inherently lacking in due process." 3 The prejudicial circumstances
surrounding the Sheppard conviction, as enumerated by the Court,
began with prejudicial publicity long before the trial - even before
Sheppard's arrest - and continued through the trial itself.
After Dr. Sheppard's wife was bludgeoned to death, he told
those who first investigated the crime that he had seen and grappled
with a "form" which he believed to be that of the murderer. Since
1. 231 F. Supp. 37 (S.D. Ohio 1964).
2. 346 F.2d 707 (6th Cir. 1965).
3. Quoting with approval from Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1965).
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no one else identified the alleged intruder, it was natural that inquiry
should begin with Dr. Sheppard. What was not proper, however, was
the newspaper coverage of subsequent events.
On the day of the funeral of the victim, a newspaper story
appeared in which the assistant county attorney, who was later the
chief prosecutor of Sheppard, criticized the Sheppard family's refusal
to permit immediate questioning. Subsequent newspaper stories
stressed Sheppard's lack of cooperation with the police when he
refused to take a lie detector test or an injection of truth serum.
According to the press, it would seem, the most serious evidence of
his noncooperation lay in his failure to confess the murder.
About two weeks after the murder, an "editorial artillery" was
commenced, suggesting that the coroner's inquest was being delayed
because of friendships in high places. After two days of editorials
the inquest was convened, and Sheppard was questioned at length,
although his attorneys were not permitted to participate; his chief
counsel was at one point "forcibly ejected from the room by the
Coroner, who received cheers, hugs, and kisses from ladies in the
audience." 4
When Sheppard was not arrested immediately after the conclusion of the inquest, the press reported evidence that tended to
incriminate Sheppard, including statements attributed to a detective
relating "findings" that were never introduced at the trial. The
newspapers also named a number of women with whom Sheppard had
allegedly been involved in extra-marital affairs, but at the trial
evidence was introduced of only one affair.
Following editorials of July 28 and July 30, Sheppard was
arrested on a charge of murder after which the publicity grew in
intensity until his indictment on August 17. The matter was scarcely
forgotten by press or public in the interval preceding the trial set
for two weeks before the November general election at which the
chief prosecutor was a candidate for municipal judge and the presiding judge was a candidate to succeed himself. Twenty-five days
before the case was set, seventy-five veniremen were called as prospective jurors. When all three Cleveland newspapers published the
names and addresses of the veniremen, all the jurors received a
number of calls - many anonymous - about the case.
At the trial itself, a long temporary table was set up inside the
bar, immediately behind the single counsel table, with one end less
than three feet from the jury box. The court assigned seats to approximately twenty representatives of newspapers and wire services at this
4. 384 U.S. at 340.
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table. In addition, several other rooms in the courthouse were assigned
to the press and for radio and television coverage, including the room
adjacent to the one in which the jury recessed during the trial and
in which it deliberated.
On the sidewalk and steps in front of the courthouse, television
and newsreel cameras were used to take pictures of judge, jurors,
witnesses, and defendant, and some interviews were conducted there.
The taking of pictures in the courtroom was permitted during recesses.
During the trial the cluster of reporters inside the bar of the
small courtroom made confidential communication between lawyer and
client difficult and sometimes impossible. Discussion between counsel
and judge, intended to be out of the jury's hearing, was conducted
in the judge's chambers; but the reporters often managed to learn and
to report in the press what had been discussed.
The jurors themselves were constantly exposed to the news media;
all except one testified at voir dire to reading or hearing broadcasts
about the trial during its nine-week course. Numerous pictures of
the jury and of individual jurors appeared in the Cleveland papers,
including pictures taken at a jury viewing of the Sheppard home.
During the trial newspaper reporters on a radio show asserted
that Sheppard conceded his guilt by hiring a prominent criminal
lawyer. Defense counsel's objections brought no relief from that or
later episodes. When Sheppard was likened in a broadcast to a
perjurer and compared to Alger Hiss, the court refused a continuance
and refused to ask how many jurors had heard the broadcast. Similarly, when other prejudicial statements were made in the press or
on the air, the court denied motions for change of venue, continuance,
and mistrial. When the jury viewed the scene of the murder, one news
media representative accompanied the jury while a helicopter flew over
the house taking pictures. After the case was submitted to the jury, the
jurors were placed in a hotel, but were allowed to place unmonitored
telephone calls.
Mr. Justice Clark observed that the news media have always been
allowed considerable latitude in reporting events that interest the
public, "even though we sometimes deplored its sensationalism." However, as earlier pointed out in Bridges v. California,' "legal trials are
not like elections, to be won through the use of the meeting-hall, the
radio, and the newspaper. '
5. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).

6.Id.at 271.
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Much of the blame for the lack of fairness in the trial was attributed to the trial judge who failed to grant change of venue, continuance, or even sequestration of the jury. The Supreme Court
condemned the conduct of the trial in these words:
While we cannot say that Sheppard was denied due process
by the judge's refusal to take precautions against the influence of
pretrial publicity alone, the court's later ruflings must be considered against the setting in which the trial was held. In light of
this background, we believe that the arrangements made by the
judge with the news media caused Sheppard to be deprived of
that "judicial serenity and calm to which [he] was entitled."
Estes v. Texas, supra, at 536. The fact is that bedlam reigned at
the courthouse during the trial and newsmen took over practically the entire courtroom, hounding most of the participants in
the trial, especially Sheppard. At a temporary table within a few
feet of the jury box and counsel table sat some 20 reporters
staring at Sheppard and taking notes. The erection of a press
table for reporters inside the bar is unprecedented. The bar of the
court is reserved for counsel, providing them a safe place in
which to keep papers and exhibits, and to confer privately with
client and co-counsel. It is designed to protect the witness and
the jury from any distractions, intrusions or influences, and to
permit bench discussions of the judge's rulings away from the
hearing of the public and the jury. Having assigned almost all
of the available seats in the courtroom to the news media the
judge lost his ability to supervise that environment. The movement of the reporters in and out of the courtroom caused frequent
confusion and disruption of the trial. And the record reveals
constant commotion within the bar. Moreover, the judge gave
the throng of newsmen gathered in the corridors of the courthouse absolute free rein. Participants in the trial, including the
jury, were forced to run a gantlet of reporters and photographers
each time they entered or left the courtroom. The total lack of
consideration for the privacy of the jury was demonstrated by the
assignment to a broadcasting station of space next to the jury
room on the floor above the courtroom, as well as the fact that
jurors were allowed to make telephone calls during their five-day
deliberation. 7
The judge was further criticized for his failure to consider ways
available to him to reduce the flow of prejudicial material and to protect the jury from outside influence. The Court said 8 the following
procedures should have been adopted:
7. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 354-55 (1966).
8. Id. at 358-63.
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(1) The number of press representatives should have been
limited; their location inside the bar should have been forbidden; and
their conduct should have been more closely regulated.
(2) The court should have insulated the witnesses.
(3) The court should have made some effort to control the release of leads, information, and gossip to the press by police officers,
witnesses, and counsel for both sides.
(4) The court should have considered on its own the possibility
of change of venue, continuance, sequestration of jurors, or even a
new trial.
The opinion included a cautionary note for the future:
[W]e must remember that reversals are but palliatives; the cure
lies in those remedial measures that will prevent the prejudice
at its inception. The courts must take such steps by rule and
regulation that will protect their processes from prejudicial outside interferences. Neither prosecutors, counsel for defense, the
accused, witnesses, court staff nor enforcement officers coming
under the jurisdiction of the court should be permitted to frustrate its function. 9
The case was remanded to the federal district court to issue the
writ and to release Dr. Sheppard, "unless the State puts him to its
charges again within a reasonable time." Before the end of June the
prosecutor announced that Dr. Sheppard would be tried again.
9. Id. at 363.
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